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Abstract ​Debt refinancing or consolidation is a trend for states worldwide. In Japan, due to               
Abenomics’ extensive monetary policy, state debt has risen greatly. This debt is deemed             
sustainable to the official discourse of financial institutions, since it is held nationally and              
debt is sought to be refinanced through the national financial system. This paper challenges              
this account that the state debt is sustainable, by analysing the specific discursive             
construction of the public the BOJ and the MOF enforce to render the state debt as                
sustainable. The result of the research is that the BOJ and the MOF try to utilise the public                  
through identity construction, but that this identity is incompatible in terms of spatial,             
temporal and ethical dimensions. This undermines the credibility of the financial           
institutions, pressuring the sustainability of the state debt and the success of Abenomics.             
This research analyses the state-specific condition that allow for state debt, and therefore             
forms a lesson in how to assess discourse by financial institutions that can be applied to                
case studies worldwide.  
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Introduction 
 
Indebtedness is one of the key issues for states in the world of today, due to increased                 
government spending after financial or economic crises. The increasing worldwide debt is            
placing a burden on individuals, corporations and governments. A turn to the consolidation             
state, to not necessarily repay state debt but to refinance it under more favourable conditions,               
is a global trend identified by Wolfgang Streeck. States seek to refinance their debt, often               
across borders through the international financial system, for cheaper interest rates while the             
totality of their debt continues to increase. Streeck’s argument gets a grip on a global trend,                
however it fails to explain the specific situation of individual states. Japan, with the massive               
increase in state debt since the late 1990s, is an interesting case study to further analyse the                 
conditions for state debt of individual states. Besides Japan, other states, such as the United               
States of America or China, too require a more thorough analysis besides the identification by               
Streeck.  
For Japan, the case study for this thesis research, the Japanese banking crisis in the               
1990s had a significant impact on the country's political economy. Facing low economic             
growth after the crisis, Japan implemented the tool of monetary easing. This is still the go-to                
method in the for current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe. Choosing a political economic strategy              
of public spending and monetary easing, part of the Abe government approach to economic              
development known as Abenomics, Japan's indebtedness rose significantly. What         
differentiates Japan from other states, is that it is not relying on the international financial               
system to refinance its debt. Japan's state debt is held nationally by the Japanese public               
through domestic banks and is thus deemed less susceptible to international financial            
disturbances and more sustainable. 
Although used extensively by central banks world wide, monetary easing as a policy             
tool is highly contested. In the Japanese case specifically, the policy strategy raised state debt               
levels to an historic high, while the impact on the real economy is low. The goal of monetary                  
easing is to raise the inflation rate to 2 percent, but so far this has not been reached. In the                    
meantime, socio-economic conditions are decreasing in Japan as exemplified in rising           
relative poverty. Whereas other central banks have stopped their monetary easing           
programmes, the Bank of Japan has announced to continue with the policy. The Federal              
Reserve of the United States of America have stopped their monetary easing programme and              
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the European Central Bank (ECB) has announced on 14 June 2018 that it will quit their                
programme of monetary expansion by the end of this year. A day after the ECB               
announcement, the Bank of Japan (BOJ) issued a statement it would continue the policy of               
monetary easing. This raises the question why the BOJ and the Abe administration still hold               
on to this policy tool, even though other major central banks have stopped their monetary               
easing programmes.  
This question can be answered by interpreting the situation of the Japanese            
government and Bank of Japan as being stuck in an ​aporia​. Neither going forward nor going                
back is an option (Zehfuss 2014, 618). But a decision has to be made, and even a continuation                  
of the present policy direction is a choice. The Bank of Japan has invested massive sums of                 
money in the policy, increasing the ratio public debt to GDP from 67 percent in 1990 to 246                  
percent in 2015. Simultaneously, the credibility of the central bank is disputed, for it fails to                
deliver on the 2 percent inflation expectation, and its authority and power as a technocratic               
institution in a democracy is contested. The aporia entails how to move on from this position,                
the choice being either to continue monetary easing or to stop.  
The choice has been made. As BOJ Governor Haruhiko Kuroda was re-elected for a              
second term this year, which is unique for this position, the continuation of the monetary               
easing programme is a fact. What is now required to be able to continue monetary easing                
with public support, is a discursive construction of the public in such a way that it allows for                  
the continuation. While financial institutions the BOJ and the Ministry of Finance (MOF) set              
out the socio-economic strategy for the years to come, the debt that is created through the                
chosen policy is carried by the Japanese population. Further, a high debt often results in strict                
austerity policies, such as decreasing state expenditure on social security. Thus convincing            
the public of the necessity and sustainability of the monetary easing programme and resulting              
increase in state debt, requires a specific discourse that this debt is nothing to worry about.                
This official discourse seeks to enable the Japanese version of the consolidation state, to              
finance debt by the issuance of government bonds for a brighter future of Japan. This paper                
argues against the claim of sustainability, by showing how the main financial institutions in              
Japan, the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance, create a construction of the identity of                 
the public that is unsustainable. This thesis takes issue with this official discourse describing              
the debt as sustainable and seeks to identify what it omits, for example the aging society and                 
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a decrease in working age participation that pressures tax income. This is the gap in the                
literature and academic research this paper sets out to address.  
This leads to the following research question: through the lenses of ethicality,            
spatiality and temporality, how is everyday life and the public constructed in the official              
discourse by the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance to allow for a continuation of the                  
monetary easing programme? The timeframe is from April 2013, the start of the rigorous              
monetary easing programme of Quantitative and Qualitative Easing (QQE) that caused a            
massive rise in sovereign debt, until the present. The analysis part of the thesis is divided in                 
three lenses through which the post-structural discourse analysis is carried out. Firstly, the             
temporal lens concerning constructions of time; secondly, the spatial lens concerning           
constructions of inclusion and exclusion; and thirdly, the ethical lens concerning construction            
of values.  
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Literature review 
 
The current monetary policy of spurring inflation to revitalise the Japanese economy through             
monetary easing, is made possible by the strong increase of the financial sector after the               
depegging of currencies, the dollar being the first one, from the gold standard in the 1970s.                
Since the issuance of money did not necessitate saving an amount of gold, the possibility of                
new financial policies arose (Graeber 2014, 361-362). The consequence was a great increase             
in finance. Finance denotes activities of extending credit believing the debtor can pay it back               
and distributing risk through diversification (Davies 2014, 387). Financialisation refers to the            
process whereby the logic of finance is extended into more and more areas of social and                
economic life (Davies 2014, 387; Robinson 2017, 62; Godechot 2015, 19). Financialisation is             
often presented as a consequence of neoliberal policies, especially state retrenchment and            
deregulation, and a dominance of finance over industry coming at the expense of real              
investment (Robinson 2017, 62). Since the financial system became increasing powerful           
while the responsibility for decision making in finance lies outside of democratic reach, with              
central banks and the private sector, financialisation is interpreted by Davies as leading to              
depoliticisation (Davies 2014, 388). It is not possible to vote for central bank policy and there                
is often a strong connection between the ruling political elite and central bankers, which              
makes the claimed independence by central banks questionable.  
The increase in finance plays a key role in Japan's current state debt. Monetary easing               
was a response to the stagnation at the end of the 1990s, caused by several financial                
instabilities. Much has been written about the coming into being of the bubble economy and               
the consequences of its burst (Kang 2018; McCann 2014; Robinson 2017; Stockwin and             
Ampiah 2017). Ever since the burst of the bubble economy, the Japanese economy has been               
stagnant. The Bank of Japan performed a leading role both in the creation and the burst of the                  
bubble. The Japanese bubble economy, that forms the start of Japanese state debt             
accumulation, in the late 1980s was the result of an asymmetric pattern of financial              
liberalisation under high savings (Kang 2018, 2). As a response to the expensive yen, the               
Bank of Japan reduced interest rates to stir inflation (McCann 2013, 324). This resulted in a                
sharp increase in asset and land prices (Kang 2018, 3-4). Bank of Japan officials felt they had                 
to intervene again, to check the boom, this time with a policy of doubling the interest rates                 
(McCann 2013, 325). The impact of the policy was enormous. Companies went bankrupt,             
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land and asset prices decreased and banks had to endure great losses due to non-performing               
loans (Kang 2018, 4). These loans would not be repaid, because they were contracted during               
the asset price bubble (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017, 49). Stagnation continued into the 1990s,              
with a systemic banking crisis in 1997-1999 (Kang 2010, 562). During that crisis, the              
government for the first time injected public funds to recapitalise banks, the beginning of a               
tradition of monetary easing. 
Japanese policy towards the socio-economic crisis caused by the Nikkei crash showed            
a combination of neoliberal reform and a strong state. Although there is discussion to what               
extent Japan’s political economy saw a shift to neoliberalism, there is in general a common               
understanding that the direction is to the neoliberal spectrum (Shibata 2016, 501). Under             
Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi, neoliberal reforms were set in motion, amongst other the             
privatisation of the postal services (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017, 50; Robinson 2017, 61). The              
goal was to solve the long running banking crisis, primarily through the purchase of              
non-performing loans (Kang 2018, 4). When current Prime Minister Shinzo Abe came into             
power for his second time in 2012 (the first time was from 20 September 2006 until 26                 
September 2007), Japan was still seized by an economic recession caused by the asset bubble               
collapse (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017, 99). Low population growth, low economic growth,            
low productivity and a decreasing labour force participation are identified by the literature as              
the most urgent issues Abe seeks to address (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017, 99).  
In order to carry out the policy of monetary easing, Abe established a close relation               
with the Japanese central bank, despite the Bank of Japan's claimed independence from the              
government. Not satisfied with the BOJ’s policy strategy thus far, Abe went so far as to                
proclaim in November 2012 that if his party was in power again, he would want to work with                  
somebody who would cooperate with the government to work towards a 2 to 3 percent               
inflation rate with bold monetary policy (Wakatabe 2015, 117). This became current            
Governor Haruhiko Kuroda. Although the BOJ is officially independent from the           
government, the Governor of the BOJ and the Board members deciding on monetary policy              
are appointed by the Diet. With Prime Minister’s Abe’s Liberal Democratic Party having a              
majority seat in the Diet, the ruling LDP can influence the BOJ to a large extent. Also, Abe                  
has increased the mandate of the BOJ so it can enforce a programme of monetary easing of                 
unconventional size, injecting huge quantities of liquidity in the market for example for the              
purchase of non-performing loans from banks or buying up government bonds with high             
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interest rates.  
The cooperation between the LDP and the BOJ is evident in Abe’s Three Arrow Plan,               
which came to known as Abenomics. The plan sets out to significantly increase liquidity, for               
which cooperation between Abe government’s MOF (as issuer of Japanese government           
bonds) and the BOJ (as main buyer of JGB) is crucial. In a joined statement, the BOJ and the                   
Abe government agreed upon the revitalisation of the Japanese economy, emphasising a            
further strengthen of ties between the BOJ and Abe administration (Nipponginkō 2013). In             
the same text, they address their future plans to revitalise the economy by aiming at a 2                 
percent inflation rate. The Three Arrow plan of Abenomics is an extension of joined              
statement (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017, 99). It holds a reflationist approach to economics,             
aiming to tackle deflation by spurring consumption and increasing liquidity (Wakatabe 2015,            
119). The First Arrow of Abenomics concerns the goal of increasing the inflation rate to 2                
percent through the policy of monetary easing, which is to be carried out by the Bank of                 
Japan (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017, 100). The expected result of this policy is that prices               
increase and consumption will rise. Spending is thus promoted over saving in Abenomics.  
The Second Arrow of Abenomics consists of increasing government spending,          
especially on infrastructural projects, such as reconstruction of areas destroyed by the 2011             
disaster and the 2020 Summer Olympics (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017, 101). The way to pay               
for these infrastructural projects, as well as increased costs for social security in the aging               
society, is by issuing Japanese government bonds and increasing state debt (Oshio and Oguro              
2015). With this approach to the state budget, the Japanese government shows an increased              
“bond dependency.” This means that the way to fill the gap between tax income and public                
spending is to issue JGB (Kang 2010, 563). Households savings is the main method JGB are                
financed, for the largest part indirectly through banks although households are increasingly            
active as investors themselves (Kang 2010, 567).  This system of public finance gets             
pressured due to households shifting their investments to other forms, such as investing             
assets, and the state's rising costs of social security. These two trends increase the gap               
between state income and state expenditures. Also, the shift in household investment            
pressures the absorption of JGB into the domestic market, pressuring the possibility of             
bridging the gap of the Japanese budget. What the Japanese government thinks is      
necessary to prevent this scenario, is to increase the growth of the economy. This is exactly                
what the Third Arrow of Abenomics sets out to accomplish. The Third Arrow comprises a               
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growth strategy through the implementation of structural reforms (Wakatabe 2015, 130). This            
includes deregulation, but not a move towards a shareholder culture. The prevalence of             
traditional corporate governance allows for state debt to be refinanced nationally (Stockwin            
and Ampiah 2017, 101). Further, it includes aspirations to reform the stagnated agricultural             
sector, to open up of the financial sector to foreign competition, to increase labour              
participation of women and to reform the culture of domestic employment (Stockwin and             
Ampiah 2017, 101-102; Wakatabe 2015, 130).  
The structural reforms thus target the financial sector and the labour market            
specifically. The revitalisation through labour participation of women has also been described            
as “the strengthened utilisation of human resources” (Wakatabe 2015, 130; Kano 2018, 5).             
Dubbed as “womenomics,” the neoliberal instrumental utilisation of female labour for GDP            
growth without an ideology of gender equality, is met with scrutiny by feminist scholars              
(Kano 2018, 1-5; Dalton 2017, 97-98). Also, the privileging of a certain group of women in                
leadership positions creates a further polarisation of women working part-time and women            
working full-time, for example making certain childcare facilities only available for women            
with regular employment and focusing in leadership positions (Dalton 2017, 99).   
The extent to which Abenomics has thus far impacted Japanese society positively            
according to its own norms is disputed. The inflation target has not been met and the impact                 
of the inflationary measures on consumption is weak (Hausman and Wieland 2015, 386).             
Further, despite the aim of the Third Arrow to increase labour participation of women and               
generate economic growth, relative poverty is increasing in Japan and women are heavily             
disadvantaged in the labour market (Melamed 2012; Allison 2013). Relative poverty is            
measured by the percentage of individuals with incomes less than half of the national median               
level (Melamed 2012). Groups affected by Abe’s neoliberal policies of flexibilisation in the             
labour market are not evenly distributed across society, since it often specifically affects             
youth and women, such as a decline of full time employment opportunities (Melamed 2012;              
Wakatabe 2015, 134). Life-time employment is decreasing, creating a polarisation between           
regular and non-regular workers and further increases in employment insecurity (Shibata           
2016, 500). About one-third of the workforce is now employed as an non-regular employee              
of which 77 percent earns less than the poverty level (Allison 2013, 8-9). This state of                
Japanese society has been described as a state of ontological insecurity due to the spread of                
the logic of the market to all aspects of life and the neoliberal identity construction of people                 
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as consumers (Allison 2013, 7). Other authors have referred to this as ‘socio-cultural             
anxiety’, an anxiety that causes people to delay or abstain from marrying and starting a               
family (McCann 2013, 327). Whether this state of ontological insecurity is caused entirely by              
Abenomics is doubtful. However, it does point at that the goal of revitalising Japan              
socio-economically is not yet within reach. 
When assessing Abenomics above, it was noted how it pushes for a neoliberal agenda.              
The neoliberal agenda sets out to increase competition, which is achieved through            
deregulation and opening up of markets to foreign investors and a smaller role of the state                
achieved through privatisation and “limits on the ability of governments to run fiscal deficits              
and accumulate debt” (Ostry, Loungani and Furceri 2016, 38). Further, with the focus on              
increasing investments and diminishing the risk-averse culture, Abenomics hints at the           
neoliberal idea that the economy can be revived through innovations (Mikitani and Mikitani             
2014, 23). The main issue with the growth strategy of Abe, is that the accumulation of debt                 
itself is bad for growth (Ostry, Loungani and Furceri 2016, 40). An option for the decrease of                 
debt is to allow the debt ratio to decline organically through growth (Ostry, Loungani and               
Furceri 2016, 40). But exactly this is what is not possible in the case of Japan, for economic                  
growth is far behind with a growth rate that enables the debt  to GDP ratio to decrease. 
Policy debates and academic critique focus on the debates concerning the material            
side of Japan’s state debt. Discussion focus on topics such as the extent to which Japan’s                
debt is sustainable (Harding 2017; Jones and Fukawa 2017; Kang 2010; Ostry, Loungani and              
Furceri 2016), an assessment of the policy of QQE (Fujiki and Tomura 2017; Greenwood              
2017; Matsuki, Sugimoto and Satoma 2015; Shirai 2017) and whether there are alternatives             
to the growth strategy through monetary easing, such as slow growth or degrowth (Kano              
2018; Karabell 2016). Although the high debt is not necessarily interpreted as a crisis, even               
most neoclassical economists see that the state debt is not continue to increase in the long                
term. They call for fiscal consolidation and consumption tax increases, reiterating neoliberal            
policies of austerity (Jones and Fukawa 2017, 8). Arguing that economic growth, debt             
repayment, default on government bonds and rising the inflation rate are no option for Japan,               
and instead, the country has found a way to live with the debt, Harding argued state debt is                  
sustainable. His idea of decreasing state debt is to simply deploy austerity measures and the               
debt will decrease bit by bit (Harding 2017). Kang questions the extent to which the MOF                
can satisfy its long term financial obligations (issues of insolvency), since the domestic             
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market that absorbs the JGB could get saturated (Kang 2010, 567). This depends on the belief                
and trust of the public and financial markets in the future solvency of the Bank of Japan and                  
the Ministry of Finance. 
   Two main narratives towards Japanese debt are coming forward in the literature. The              
narrative by government officials and neoliberal economics claiming that indeed the           
sovereign debt is high and actions are necessary, but the debt is held nationally by domestic                
financial institutions, so there is less risk. This can be called the Japan-is-different narrative.              
As the economy grows the debt will organically decrease and the debt can be dealt with in a                  
sustainable way. Besides an “organic” reduction in debt, debt should be reduced through             
fiscal consolidation and austerity policies. The second, critical narrative contains that the debt             
level is far too high to decrease in an “organic” way, especially with rising inequality that                
pressures economic growth. Further, the reliance on the domestic market is questioned and             
insolvency issues arise. Also, critics note, the monetary policy of QQE hardly affects the real               
economy in terms of rising inflation rate, which remains stagnant. Therefore, holding on to an               
aggressive programme of monetary easing is unsustainable and the high debt itself is             
unsustainable. Therefore, alternatives such as slow growth or degrowth should be seriously            
considered.  
Approaching financial crises and interventions in the economy such as monetary           
easing by financial institutions not only through a material lens but also through a discursive               
lens, is Davies. He focuses on how institutions have shaped the debate around financial crises               
and how this particular perspective has shaped the solutions they consider (Davies 2014,             
392). He criticises the focus on the material dimensions of this debate: “The point is that as                 
the problems of the financial crisis are defined in terms of the liquidity needed for sustaining                
the circulation of commodities, the solutions focus on the institutions such as banks and              
governments that affect that liquidity” (Davies 2014, 393). A need to focus on institutions              
through a discursive lens is thus necessary to fully assess what it is that allows for                
interventions in the economy through increased liquidity and austerity, especially since it            
disrupts people’s everyday lives disguised as pragmatic and technical decision making           
(Davies 2014, 389).  
As is apparent from the literature assessed for this review, authors have either focused              
on criticising Abenomics or stressing the need for such monetary policy. A study wherein the               
identity construction that forms a precondition for the continuation of Abenomics is assessed,             
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has not been done before. What this paper will add to the literature, is an assessment of the                  
construction of the public in the official discourse by financial institutions carrying out             
monetary policy, the Bank of Japan and the ministry of Finance, in order to gain insight in the                  
discourse that allows the QQE programme to be carried out despite the criticism it has               
received. Besides the obvious material elements necessary for monetary easing, which is            
capital and political power to carry out the policy, are various discursive elements. In the               
process of spurring consumption, increasing the value of goods, services and people for better              
ways to utilise them, the BOJ and Abe’s MOF enforce a discursive construction of the public.                
Through the analytical lenses of temporality, spatiality and ethicality, the construction of the             
public by the BOJ and the MOF will be assessed.  
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Methodology 
 
The research methodology is a poststructuralist discourse analysis. The aim of the research is              
to analyse how the public is discursively constructed; to paraphrase Foucault, what is             
“sayable” and what is “thinkable” by the public concerning the BOJ’s and the MOF’s              
monetary easing programme and subsequent rise in state debt. Poststructural discourse           
analysis focuses on the construction of identity through language and representation, and            
aims to reveal instabilities within discourse (Hansen 2006, 15). Official financial policy            
discourse is the discourse through which the BOJ and Abe government's MOF actions are              
legitimized. Policymakers aim to create a stable link between identity and policy, while             
poststructural discourse analysis reveals what is omitted in the process of identity            
construction.  
To develop a grip on the official discourse of these two financial institutions and              
official representatives of the government, sixty primary sources were assessed. These           
sources include policy statements, speeches, reports, videos and other media by which Prime             
Minister Abe, the BOJ and the MOF have communicated with the public. A series of videos                
specifically are part of a communication strategy by the government of Japan to reach a               
larger, less specialised audience than the formal communication with the public. Compared to             
the formal statements, the tone in the videos is less formal and more “fun”. Sources used are                 
both in the Japanese and in the English language. Although the BOF and MOF publish               
translated documents available in English, this is not the case for all of the sources taken                
under consideration.   
Arguing against “problem-solving theories” who assume the world as it is and sustain             
the existing order, critical theories (which includes poststructuralism) claim there is no such             
thing as a neutral or apolitical position to identify the world and what is wrong with it (Cox                  
1981, 130). The poststructuralist approach is not aiming at rectifying wrongs, neither does it              
claim to be able to fix things (Zehfuss 2014, 611). What it does, is revealing the assumptions                 
lying beneath claims made by people of authority, which often includes governmental            
institutions, politicians and academics. It calls the prevailing institutions and power           
relationships into question (Zehfuss 2014, 621). Especially state institutions claiming a           
neutral or apolitical position are viewed critically, for claims of knowledge are never             
unconditioned (Devetak 2005, 163). That the financial dimension of everyday life only feels             
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political when it is disrupted, allows for the idea that interventions are necessary (Davies              
2014, 285). A discourse analysis of financial policy aims at showing the political dimension              
of finance by identifying the instabilities of the discourse, in order to re-politicize finance.  
The BOJ and the MOF deploy an interventionist discourse based on neoclassical            
economic theory, whereby the economy is presented in an oversimplified model of a             
closed-circuit that can be controlled (Gilpin 2001, 49). Central bank policy is presented as              
norm-free or value-free. Consumers are believed to be guided by rational choice, evident in              
the BOJ reasoning that consumer will spend more with an inflationary mind-set (Gilpin 2001,              
52). An intervention, such as the altering of the interest rate on loans between banks, should                
simply fix the issue of deflation. Larger economic issues are not interpreted as issues within               
system itself, but are claimed to be caused by exogenous shocks. Since neoclassical financial              
institutions seek for a way to fix issues in the economic system as it is, thus taking the world                   
as it is, this theoretical approach is part of the “problem-solving theories” that Cox identified               
(Cox 1981, 130).  
As public institutions, the BOJ and the MOF need to be recognised in their authority               
and credibility by the public. In the strategy of increasing the inflation rate, the public can                
even become part of the plan to get to the 2 percent. “The goal of policymakers is to present a                    
policy that appears legitimate and enforceable to its relevant audience” (Hansen 2006, 25).             
Getting a message through to the audience is of ontological importance. It legitimizes the              
institution on an ontological level and functions as a platform for promoting and enforcing              
monetary easing policy. Through discourse analysis, it is possible to make clear the          
assumptions and self-evident statements in these institutions. It is a sign of power that a               
person or institution can utter statements and assume the message conveyed to be             
self-evident. An example is that a 2 percent inflation rate will sustain the state debt and                
therefore there is no debt crisis or debt issue. The statement that inflation, the increase of                
prices, is good for the Japanese people, is a message that is counterintuitive to the public.                
However, the BOJ is more than willing to explain why this naive standpoint is incorrect. The                
public is fed with “evident statements” claiming truth, while not coincidentally being in line              
with the BOJ inflation target. Further, speech acts by the BOJ use stereotypical power              
relations to strengthen their message and say something about society. The naive public is not               
coincidentally symbolised by a young woman who only cares about the price of her coffee. In                
this way, official discourse exerts a political message.  
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How poststructuralist discourse analysis assesses the role of policy within a discourse,            
is that policy is the solution to something that is created as a problem within the discourse                 
itself. Policy gives the direction for action to something that is primarily a problem because               
of the way the discourse constructs it (Hansen 2006, 18). A post-structural focus on state               
institutions thus question the logic of the state in its imposition of identity (Devetak 2005,               
176). Analysing the discursive condition for the continuation of monetary easing asks for a              
form of deconstruction of the official discourse by double reading, to both get a grip on how                 
the official discourse appears stable within itself and on how it becomes unstable when              
applying pressure on instabilities in terms of temporality, spatiality and ethicality (Devetak            
2005, 169).  
Focusing on institutions begs the question what the relation is between verbal            
utterances and policy. Institutions do not always follow the policy they publicly declare, and              
this is not something poststructuralist approach assumes (Hansen 2006, 24). The Abe            
government, for example, does not seem to fully follow up on the Third Arrow of               
Abenomics. The process of policy making is also not a public process and therefore discourse               
analysis is applicable to the analysis of deception and misinformation (Hansen 2006, 24-25).             
The BOJ and the MOF too, are limiting what documents are published. However, to analyse               
what is published, what these two institutions do chose to bring out in open, is all the more                  
valuable for it emphasizes how these institutions want to construct their own identity and the               
public’s identity.  
These sources of the official discourse will be assessed through the analytical lenses             
of temporality (time), spatiality (inclusion and exclusion) and ethicality (values). Not only            
will the analysis shed light on how these dimensions are constructed in relation to the public,                
but also what this allows the BOJ and the MOF to do. The three chapters of the analysis are                   
divided into the temporal, spatial and ethical dimension, but the division is not strict, as they                
tie in together. 
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The temporal trap: the BOJ and the MOF are losing time and credibility  
 
As mentioned in the literature review, the issuance of Japanese government bonds is key to               
bridging the gap in the budget of the Ministry of Finance. This gap is created as a                 
consequence of the aging society, through a decrease in tax income and an increase in social                
security expenditure. Domestic absorbance of the JGB to bridge the gap is a necessity. With               
the goal of promoting the purchase of JGB by the general public, the MOF published various                
Japanese-language commercials lasting no longer than one minute, available on its           
YouTube-channel. This segment of commercial videos has the highest number of viewers of             
all videos published by the MOF. It shows Japanese men and women preparing for a bright                
future by investing in JGB, to be able to marry, to follow university courses or to enjoy a                  
relaxed life in retirement (MOFJapan 2018​b​; MOFJapan 2018​c​; MOFJapan 2017​b​). The           
temporal dimension of these videos is evident: investing in JGB now will enable a bright               
future for the investor.                  
A second segment of videos published by the MOF communicates a different image             
of the future. This segment consists of short videos for the purpose of explaining a certain                
policy direction or the current financial state of the country, often in English. One exemplary               
video is the following. In an English-language video, a female robotic voice bluntly explains              
how worse the position of Japanese state finance is at the moment (MOFJapan 2017​a​). With               
a cheerful musical tone in the background, the viewer is confronted with the following              
analysis: “Japan's public debt has been increasing year by year. The outstanding amount of              
Japan's public debt at the end of the fiscal year 2017 is estimated to be 865 trillion Yen. The                   
amount is equivalent to about 15 years’ tax revenue. This will leave a huge burden for future                 
generations” (MOFJapan 2017 ​a​). The video shows illustrations supporting the story told,           
ending with the ominous graph that shows the rise of state debt up to the present, “reaching                 
the worst level” (MOFJapan 2017 ​a​). The difference between this video and the JGB             
commercials is striking. This video shows that the MOF is well aware that rising state debt is                 
detrimental to the Japanese budget and the future generation. Emphasising lower tax returns             
paves the way for interventionist policies in the future, such as austerity measures and              
monetary easing, which necessitates the issuance of government bonds by the Ministry of             
Finance.  
This is a conflicting message in the dimension of temporality the MOF sends here.              
17 
 
Investing in JGB supposedly leads to a brighter future for individual citizens, while the              
issuance of JGB leads to a higher state debt which burdens future generations. The              
Japanese-language public is led to believe a bright future is within reach, while this future               
ignores the dire financial situation of the Japanese state, that the MOF is obviously aware of.                
The general Japanese public should not worry, and move towards a bright future. Opposite to               
the message in the commercials, investing in JGB might even be a bad investment. The two                
temporalities do not match, which is an instability in the official discourse of the MOF from                
the lens of temporality.  
There is also a third segment of videos on the MOFchannel, consisting of unedited              
documentation of policy meetings, lasting from 45 minutes to an hour, in Japanese. Although              
informative, these videos are not very accessible due to the long length, which results in a                
low number of views. It is interesting how informative videos are more accessible to an               
English-language public than to a Japanese-language public. What could account for the            
spatial differentiation between the two audiences, is that one audience is specialised and             
operates in the world of international finance and the other is the regular general public. After                
the bubble economy burst, the BOJ was criticised in world of international finance for not               
acting swiftly enough. When they acted, it was with the wrong tools (Shirai 2017, 1). Its                
credibility amongst international financial institutions faltered. After the global financial          
crisis, former BOJ board member Shirai argues, BOJ Governor Kuroda implemented the            
Quantitative and Qualitative Easing programme without hesitation, to eliminate the          
international credibility issues (Shirai 2017, 1). However, after a few years of            
implementation, it is exactly this monetary policy that is questioned, for example by former              
chief economist at the IMF Olivier Blanchard (Evans-Pritchard 2016). To publish material            
that acknowledges the dire financial situation, could be interpreted as a recognition of such              
international criticism. That central banks operate internationally and therefore come to stand            
apart from people’s everyday life is something that Davies notes (Davies 2014, 388). The              
instability in temporality thus has a spatial aspect, since the temporal instability is             
communicated clearly to an English-language audience and it is not communicated as clearly             
to a Japanese-language audience.  
Besides the commercial videos aimed at the public directly, there is a second strategy              
within the dimension of temporality by financial institutions to make the audience complicit             
with its policy. This is called forward guidance and it is deployed by central banks               
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worldwide, including the BOJ. In forward guidance, central banks give insight into their             
future policy strategy concerning the rise or decline of the interest rate through public              
statements or speeches, with the idea of influencing expectations of the market and the              
public. Central bank officials are well aware of the function of the language they use, that                
speech acts guides and prepares investors, businesses and consumers (Speciale and O’Brien            
2017). The Bank of Japan too has issued various statements concerning the strategy of              
forward guidance, acknowledging the power it exercises and even measuring the effects of             
the policy strategy through surveys amongst the public (Shirai 2014​b​; Shirai 2014​c​). The             
public is thus allowed to talk back, but their voices are channelled through the questionnaires               
of the BOJ.  
The continued repetition by BOJ Governor Kuroda on his aim to get to a 2 percent                
inflation rate is a form of forward guidance such as: “The Bank will continue with QQE,                
aiming to achieve the price stability target of 2 percent, as long as it is necessary for                 
maintaining that target in a stable manner” (Kuroda 2014, 4). Described as “hinting at              
intentions”, forward guidance “is used as a communication strategy to generate ​additional            
monetary accommodation” (Shirai 2014​a​, 4). By issuing public statements and later follow            
up on the strategy, a central bank shows commitment to the long term goal. If the central                 
bank is committed and does indeed follow up on the strategy presented in the statements, it                
gains the trust of financial markets and the public (Wakatabe 2015, 124). And when trust               
exists between the public, financial markets and the BOJ, the public and financial markets              
will help the BOJ moving towards its policy goals. Forward guidance can work as a               
self-fulfilling prophecy. The BOJ offers the public (households and businesses) a glimpse of             
the future. This is not a linear construction of time, but rather a construction of time in which                  
time and the events that happen therein impacts the present, leading to exactly that depicted               
future. The BOJ hopes the audience follows the direction shown in the glimpse of the future                
and by acting accordingly, primarily by having faith in the commitment by the BOJ and               
increase spending to spur inflation. 
As mentioned in the literature review, the BOJ and the Abe government issued a              
joined statement in January 2013 in which they expressed their ambitions for revitalising the              
economy and achieving the 2 percent inflation rate. This is a great example of forward               
guidance (Nipponginkō 2013). Although former BOJ Governor Shirakawa criticised creating          
2 percent inflation expectations, deeming that they are not realistic, Governor Kuroda has not              
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shown doubts (Wakatabe 2015, 117). The public statement committed to the following:            
“[QQE] will achieve the price stability target of 2 percent in terms of the year-on-year rate of                 
change in the consumer price index (CPI) at the earliest possible time, with a time horizon of                 
about two years” (Kuroda 2013​b​). Mentioning the specific time span was considered            
essential to gain the confidence of the public as part of the Bank’s intention to overcome mild                 
deflation (Shirai 2014​a​, 4). Shirai, then a member of the Policy Board of the Bank of Japan,                 
adds that: “Personally, I am aware of the possibility that it may take some time to achieve the                  
2 percent target, since the duration depends crucially on the pace of improvement in the               
employment and income situation in Japan” (Shirai 2014​a​, 5).” The personal note hints at the               
existence of different opinions concerning this topic within the BOJ. However, in his             
speeches and statements, Governor Kuroda cannot get caught with doubt. When confronted            
with the fact that Japan is not getting close to the 2 percent inflation rate target, he claims the                   
BOJ needs more time, but that the 2 percent inflation rate will be met at the earliest possible                  
time. This indication just moves along with Kuroda’s statements. In 2013, the expected time              
was 2015 (Nipponginkō 2013). In 2015, he expected the inflation target would be met in               
2016 (Kuroda 2015​a ​, 5; Kuroda 2015​b​, 2).  
In a commentary published 26 June 2018, Shirai questions the continuation of the             
monetary easing programme of her former employer, stating that the impact on inflation and              
inflation expectations have not been successful. Further, she claims that there is little support              
for the inflation target of 2 percent amongst households, since they already perceive prices as               
high and already have an inflationary rather than a deflationary mind-set (Shirai 2018). This              
criticism is not acknowledged by Governor Kuroda, stating in a session with the Diet towards               
his re-election that “there is momentum toward the 2 percent inflation” (Baird 2018​a​).             
Kuroda continues feeling the need to fight the deflationary mind-set by forward guidance.             
Despite missing his previous targets, Kuroda is not afraid to name a year: “We are thinking                
we will reach it by 2019. But we are not saying whether it will be at the beginning, middle, or                    
end” (Baird 2018 ​a​). In light of the previous analysis, these statements at can be interpreted as                
a continuation of the temporal trap the BOJ has set for itself. Not reaching the target, which                 
in light of the history is likely to happen, will continue the decrease in credibility by the                 
public. 
Another instance of forward guidance is evident from press conferences by Shinzo            
Abe, where he strongly urges the public to resist the deflationary mind-set (Japanese             
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Government Internet TV 2016). His speech starts with a warning: “We can go back to the                
long tunnel of deflation. Now is the time to maximise Abenomics. Should we accelerate              
Abenomics further, or should we go back?” (Japanese Government Internet TV 2016). Going             
forward, as we learn from his speech, includes the enforcements of structural reforms,             
regional revitalisation and an increase in childcare facilities. Accelerating into the future            
includes the spatial aspect of including women in the labour market as regular employees, as               
Abe mentions in his speech (Japanese Government Internet TV 2016). However, forward            
guidance is vulnerable to criticism when it is not followed up by policy actions. Women are                
constructed as instruments to get to better future with a better economy, which is a future that                 
is not necessarily better for these women as the majority remains employed as non-regular              
labourers under precarious conditions (Dalton 2017, 98; Kano 2018, 5). This spatial aspect of              
discourse will be further addressed in the section on the spatial dimension below. Note how               
Abe’s speech is not only a form of forward guidance by imagining a brighter future, but also                 
by distancing Japan from its past. Imagining the future as distanced from the older Self (the                
older Japan troubled with stagnation), is also an elimination of the problems of the past. As                
though Abenomics’ acceleration to the future is not a continuation in time but a rupture with                
the past, and is thus unhindered by troubles of the past. These troubles include the precarious                
conditions of non-regular labourers, both men and women, as their situation is largely             
ignored (Dalton 2017, 100). The temporal dimension of Abenomics as a rupture with the              
past, is incompatible with the spatial dimension of claiming to include everyone moving             
forward to a brighter future. Abe’s use of the word “we” in his speech, suggests an inclusion                 
of the entire public.  
In statements of forward guidance, time is depicted as something manageable, the            
events happening and the policies carried out as something that will develop in a linear way.                
However, as the speech acts of forward guidance or not met with results, this undermines the                
credibility of these statements. Therefore, the BOJ is stuck in the temporal projection it made               
for itself. The race against the clock that up until now is not won by the BOJ is a temporal                    
instability that was inherent in the projected time frame from the beginning with the claim               
that the 2 percent should be achieved at the earliest possible time, which is expected to be                 
about two years. After letting go of the two-year time time frame, a sense of when the earliest                  
possible time is could be practically any time, since the earliest possible time would be the                
time when it is achieved, be that two, five, ten or twenty years from now.  
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Besides the temporal traps of envisioning a bright future to the public while omitting              
the dire financial situation and forward guidance, there is a third way in which a temporal                
instability comes into being in the construction of the public. The interventionist policies             
accommodated by forward guidance are embedded in a larger temporal instability in            
neoliberal discourse. The simple way the official discourse describes the economy in terms of              
cause and effect within as a closed-circuit circulation, leaving out all aspects thought of as               
exogenous to the economic system, makes it easy to intervene. This, too, has a spatial               
dimension. The neoliberal inspired discourse suppresses differences (Davies 2014, 398). In           
the videos published by the BOJ and the MOF, each family is the same and wants to own the                   
same things. Through the creation of a simple story, it is possible to create a narrative in                 
which it is easy to intervene in the economy, knowing what the consequences will be for each                 
household. A video published by the BOJ, in which a woman is informed by the Bank’s                
operations by a talking banknote, exemplifies this (BOJchannel 2013). The woman in the             
video wonders about the way in which the BOJ maintains price stability. The explanation by               
the banknote is swift: the BOJ lowers interest rates, encouraging people to buy things, since               
interest rates decline when more money goes into circulation, and rise when there is less               
money (BOJchannel 2013).  
As mentioned above, the simple depiction of cause and effect allows for intervention.             
Davies describes how, after the Global Financial Crisis, economies worldwide got into a             
“deflationary spiral where falling wages, high unemployment, and low interest rates provoke            
a recession that reinforces the conditions that brought about the recession in the first place”               
(Davies 2014, 392). The history of BOJ interventions depicts a similar cause and effect              
relation of remaining stuck in a cycle of crises. The BOJ helped create the bubble economy                
and it helped the burst of the bubble economy. A solution to the stagnation was again a                 
large-scale intervention by the BOJ in the form of monetary easing. The increase in state               
debt, the consequence of QQE which is now reaching an unsustainable level, demands new              
interventionist action. The BOJ and MOF are stuck in their own temporality of responding to               
a crisis again and again. The way forward is imagined by a response to the past crisis, not by                   
looking at what Japanese society needs for the future. From the neoliberal discourse, financial              
institutions were expected to intervene. The Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance feel a                
need to act, to resolve the crisis they partially created themselves. The BOJ and the MOF thus                 
22 
 
need the discourse of control and intervention, to remain credible and hold on to their claimed                
authority. 
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Spatial differentiation: you cannot do without us but we can do without some of you 
 
In the analysis of Abe’s speech through the lens of temporality in the previous section, the                
spatial element of inclusion and exclusion in the construction of the public came forward. In               
this section the dimension of spatiality is further analysed. 
Due to the temporal instability of failing to deliver on the expectations it created itself 
through forward guidance, the BOJ’s credibility amongst the public is diminishing. In the 
spatial construction of the BOJ in relation to the public it is as though the Bank tries to cover 
up the credibility issue by constructing the public as though the BOJ is necessarily and 
inherently part of the public’s everyday life. In its videos aimed at a larger public, the Bank 
of Japan stays close to the experience of ordinary people with the monetary system, focusing 
on the issuance of bank notes, the circulation of money and tackling counterfeit (BOJchannel 
2013; BOJchannel 2014). Both videos emphasise the importance of the Bank by explaining 
how Japan’s anti-counterfeit technology is top-class and how its standards are very high. In 
one instance the lead character (the banknote professor) asks his female sidekick whether she 
has ever noticed that banknotes outside Japan are crumbled and dirty, while Japanese 
banknotes are clean and neat (BOJchannel 2013). The final words of the woman in the video 
are: “I’d always taken it for granted that we can withdraw cash and buy things with money, 
but it’s all possible thanks to the fact that our confidence in money is ensured (...) I see that 
the Bank of Japan plays a key role in our daily lives” (BOJchannel 2013). By focusing on 
daily life experience of the public, the Bank tries to connect with people. 
At the end of the video, BOJ Governor Kuroda enters the video (BOJchannel 2013). 
Speaking directly to the audience, he says that he hopes that the audience now understands 
how the Bank of Japan is tied closely to everybody’s daily lives [mina san no fudan no 
seikatsu] (BOJchannel 2013). “We must explain in easy-to-understand terms how we arrived 
at decisions on which our policies and actions are based, and seek people’s understanding,” 
Kuroda explains why this video was published. He acknowledges that the Japanese economy 
faces many challenges, but that through achieving achieving price stability, the BOJ will face 
these challenges. In the video, Kuroda keeps his vocabulary simple and does not specify 
which challenges he identifies. Thus, Kuroda does not make it clear to his audience how the 
method used by the Bank is contributing to a solution. Speeches by Kuroda aimed at a 
specialised audience do identify the challenge, which is the deflationary mind-set (Kuroda 
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2013​b​; Kuroda 2014). This is exactly what the BOJ seeks to reverse to an inflationary 
mind-set by raising its credibility. The different approach to different audiences in depth of 
explanation and difficulty of words used is noteworthy. Is Governor Kuroda underestimating 
the general public? Perhaps, but it could also be that the message of how the BOJ is 
connected with everyday life is less positive when Kuroda has to mention the consequences 
of monetary policy. Monetary easing has short term effects such as a lower interest rate on 
government bonds (which has notable if not disastrous consequences for investment funds 
that take less risk with long term investments, often with a social goal, such as pension 
funds). The large amount of cheap money lowers interest rates on regular savings as well, 
decreasing the profitability of household savings. Since savings do not reap any profit, people 
invest their money in other things, such as housing, driving up prices in the housing market, 
creating potential bubbles. On the long term, great increases in state debt often lead to 
austerity measures, lowering social benefits and increasing inequality. In Japan, the policy of 
monetary easing turns every citizen into a debtor, not only the Japanese people living today, 
but also those that have not yet been born. The construction of a positive relation with the 
public is much easier when this is omitted.  
While the BOJ and the MOF write themselves into the everyday lives of the public on                
the one hand, it establishes distinctions in the public on the other hand. The public is                
differentiated in the extent to which groups in society are part of the crowd that is heading                 
towards a bright future. The speech acts that are published for this part of the official                
discourse are aimed directly at the public. The videos by the MOF are a key example. They                 
frame the public as a consumer of Japanese government bonds and a producer of a certain                
lifestyle. As becomes apparent from the analysis, there is a gendered differentiation at work.
 
Zooming in to the series of video commercials for JGB of June 2018, it depicts stories                
filmed in high quality of different people that have different goals to save money for. One                
video specifically highlights the desired future of three young Japanese women (MOFJapan            
2018​b​). One wants the pursue a dancing career abroad, one wants to start her own business as                 
a fashion designer and one wants to get married and start a family. Another video shows a                 
retired couple, enjoying an active lifestyle and taking care of their grandchild every once and               
awhile (MOFJapan 2018​c​). A third video follows a married Japanese man (MOFJapan            
2018​d​). Through the imaging, it is made clear he puts a lot of effort into taking care of his                   
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family, which as a man includes being the breadwinner of the family. On his child’s birthday                
he has to sent his congratulations digitally since he is away for work. All three commercials                
end with the tagline “there is love in Japanese government bonds [kokusai ni ha ai ga aru].                 
All of these dreams for the future are to be made a reality through investing in JGB. Although                  
women are constructed as part of the public, they are constructed as different from their male                
counterparts. Stereotypical gender norms for both men and women are reiterated, of women             
wanting work part time while marrying with a male full time employee.  
Another example of the official discourse that establishes gender norms, is a video by              
the BOJ. In this video, two siblings (a younger brother and older sister) are taken on a trip                  
through the history and current operations of the Bank, with banknotes as their guides.              
Throughout the video, the elder sister knows more and better answers to the questions the               
banknote figures ask the siblings, even leading to a compliment by the 10.000-Yen banknote              
(BOJchannel【日本銀行動画チャンネル】2014). The contrast with this female high school        
student and the depiction of women later in their lives by the MOF is great. This corresponds                 
to male and female students having equal opportunities in schooling, but that the real gender               
differences come into being during employment (Dalton 2017, 95). This is visible in the              
video of the BOJ as well, especially in the animated segments, since examples of business               
owners, car dealers, bankers and taxpayers in general are male. Of the scarce women that are                
depicted in the video, one holds a baby and explains to her husband how in times of deflation                  
she rather not has him buy golf accessories. Another depiction is a woman discussing with               
her husband whether they can buy a car. The husband carries out the transaction and goes to                 
the car dealer to finish the deal. The last woman depicted in the video is shopping for a red                   
dress online. Finally, after the exploration of the two siblings has ended and they are back in                 
their bedroom having difficulty to comprehend the fact they they have just spent time with               
banknote figures coming to life and bringing them to other spaces through a magical portal,               
their mother calls from downstairs that the rice is cooked.  
What does this construction of women allow the BOJ and Abe government to do? It               
allows for a combination of utilisation of women to increase GDP growth through labour              
market participation, while holding on to the conservative values popular amongst many            
voters for Abe’s party the LDP. The utilisation of women becomes clear from Shinzo Abe’s               
speech at the General Assembly of the United Nations in 2013, where he explains his growth                
strategy for Japanese economy: “What will serve as both a factor for and outcome of growth                
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will be to mobilize the power of women, a point almost self-evident at this gathering. There is                 
a theory called "womenomics," which asserts that the more the advance of women in society               
is promoted, the higher the growth rate becomes. Creating an environment in which women              
find it comfortable to work and enhancing opportunities for women to work and to be active                
in society is no longer a matter of choice for Japan. It is instead a matter of the greatest                   
urgency” (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2013). Abe himself connects the strategy              
of “womenomics” to Japan’s international stance. Creating “a society in which women            
shine,” is not only a matter of domestic politics, but also a matter of international diplomacy                
(Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet 2013). Abe avoids using words such as ‘gender’,               
‘equality’ or ‘feminism’, instead choosing ‘mobilisation’ and ‘to be active in society’. This is              
part of a semantic strategy that is not unique to Abe. It is used by Japanese governments since                  
1999, when the government issued a gender policy that should not offend conservative voters              
(Kano 2018, 5). This semantic choice shows the specific identity construction of women by              
the Abe government, that their labour force participation is primarily to work towards the              
national goals. 
The participation of women in the workforce is primarily constructed as a way to              
further the improvement of the economy. The spatial aspect holds that women are included              
insofar their participation improves the economy. Boosting productivity while working and           
contributing tax to pay for Japan’s aging society as part-time employees is accepted. Women              
in non-regular positions are mostly ignored by policy makers, maintaining an identity            
construction of women foremost as mothers and wives (Dalton 2017, 102). The welfare             
system that is in place is based around a male breadwinner and a female caregiver, as                
communicated in the JGB video commercials (Kano 2018, 7). The tax system discourages             
married women to work and thus communicates a set of conservative values for the role of                
women (EAF Editorial Board 2017). Since marriage is deemed as a secure place to be in as a                  
woman, it is even an appealing foresight to young women nowadays (Kano 2018, 7). The               
official discourse creates an ethical differentiation between women. Abe needs women that            
“shine”, to work towards his goals in the international context, such as increasing the ranking               
of Japan in the Global Gender Gap Index (Kano 2018, 4). This is also the reason why Abe                  
chose the United Nations as his audience to promote “womenomics”. But even more, the              
Japanese government needs a majority of women to aspire first and foremost to start a family                
and care for elders.  
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Not only women are excluded as part of the public, immigrants are excluded as well.               
In none of the above mentioned videos are non-Japanese represented, neither is there mention              
of immigrants in any of the speeches by Kuroda. The decrease of the working age population                
in the aging society puts a high pressure on state tax income and increases social security                
expenditure (Kang 2010, 563). This necessitates the massive issuance of JGB to fill the gap               
in the budget.  Regular employment possibilities for migrant workers are ignored, even            
though the shrinking population and aging society brings new burdens to Japan’s fiscal             
health, as tax income from work decreases due to a decrease in the working age population                
(United Nations 2001, 53). The research from the UN report concludes that in order to               
maintain a constant working age population, the population would consist of one third             
migrants and descendants in 20150 (United Nations 2001, 58). This is a future perspective              
that is politically impossible to promote, as even short-term labour immigrants are distrusted             
and the Japanese government takes a turn towards nationalism (Stockwin and Ampiah 2017,             
107; Yee 2013). Prime Minister Abe and his Cabinet are aware of the incompatibility of               
negative sentiment by the population towards foreigners and the influx of immigrants as a              
solution to budget problems. This is evident from the lack of policies that includes migration               
as an option (Peng 2013).  
The perspective that is promoted as a solution, is a construction of the future in which                
technological developments in production and agriculture have led to innovations so that            
low-skilled labourers are needed less. This includes innovations such as autonomous           
agricultural machines. The narrative the Japanese government tries to push forward is a             
strong believe in technological developments, which is an aspect of the neoliberal worldview.             
It continues on the idea that economic progress will always happen because there will be new                
inventions that will cause production, jobs, export and consumption , thus boosting the    
economy. The focus on developments in AI rather than increasing the working age             
population by immigration, is evident from speeches by BOJ Governor Kuroda, claiming that             
AI is a serious way to reduce labour shortage: “[S]pecific examples of labor-saving and              
efficiency-improving investment include hotels and Japanese-style inns using artificial         
intelligence (AI) or robots to take care of their customers, construction firms introducing             
drones at construction sites, and transportation firms halving the number of workers at             
warehouses by building automated ones” (Kuroda 2017). However, by ignoring immigrants           
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altogether is to ignore reality, as there are foreign labourers in Japan. In the current official                
discourse, they are rendered voiceless by financial institutions. 
Another example is the video titled “The near future…” published by the Public              
Relations Office Government of Japan on the platform Japanese Government Internet TV            
(Seifu no intānettoterebi 2018​a​). In the near future depicted in this video, Japanese people              
(especially those living in rural areas, as the video mentions) are supported by AI in their                
daily lives. Household appliances orders lunch, drones deliver packages and autonomous           
agricultural machines plough the fields. The idea communicated concerning employment is         
that more can be done by AI, so less low-skilled workers and farmers are necessary.               
Although it not explicitly stated, the video communicates that Japan needs less foreign             
labourers in the future since they are mostly active in these sectors. Agriculture is a struggling                
part of the Japanese economy. It is highly expensive, using a lot of government subsidies, and                
the average age of farmers is high. It is identified as one of the regions in which foreign                  
labour is required (Peng 2013). An accompanying video explains: “Environmental          
challenges, disasters and terrorism, regional revitalization, shortage of labour, urban          
concentration, declining birth-rate and aging. All of these can be resolved with the             
implementation of sophisticated and advanced technology” (Seifu no intānettoterebi 2018​b​).          
The idea of Society 5.0 is a strategy by the Japanese government to push for innovations by                 
tech companies, acceptance of AI technology in society and a way to develop a new export                
product that will conquer the world. This strategy deploys the construction of identity around              
technological innovations, setting the new 5.0 society in a history of technological            
innovations to which Japanese firms have successfully contributed, dismissing the lost           
decades, thus again proposing a temporal rupture with the past. In the process, the discourse               
omits the group of foreign labourers that are in Japan now and contribute to society. 
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The ethical dimension: consume and start families to be a responsible and patriotic             
Japanese 
 
The process of spatial differentiation discussed above clearly communicated different values           
for men and for women, while completely ignoring non-Japanese labourers. The ethical            
dimension of the analysis looks deeper into the aspect of values and responsibility             
communicated by the official discourse, starting with implications of hierarchy. 
As mentioned above, forward guidance is the strategy by which central banks show a              
glimpse of the future, with the hope that this glimpse functions as a self-fulfilling prophecy.               
The communication strategy is used to influence the public’s expectations and behaviour,            
pushing the public forwards the BOJ’s and the MOF’s most important goal, namely to rise               
the inflation rate. Besides a temporal dimension, forward guidance holds an ethical aspect as              
well. The simple depiction of cause and effect in the models of a closed economy,               
communicates a responsibility to households. If the public consumes and buys JGB, they help              
bringing the bright future into effect. If they do not, the public is guilty of the “deflationary                 
mind-set”.   
The videos by the BOJ strongly hint at the negative consequences of deflation             
(BOJchannel【日本銀行動画チャンネル】2013). In the temporal construction of forward       
guidance, the public is constructed as a entity that follows the financial institution. The              
ethical dimension is the implication of hierarchy. The public is a target to influence from               
above by financial institution who know better. This ties in with the construction of the public                
as consumer of JGB, for the behaviour that is demanded of the public is to save less and                  
spend more. In the videos and texts by central bankers when focusing on the cycles of                
deflation and inflation, the public is confined to its actions as consumers, to make salary and                
to spend salary (Kuroda 2013​b​; Shirai 2014​b​). The characters in the videos also show a lot of                 
sympathy and understanding for BOJ policy decisions when it is exemplified in terms of what               
a person can or cannot consume. The spending behaviour of Japanese people are also put in a                 
temporal time frame, since there is a strong sense of causality in the possibility to break                
through deflation. It can only be broken when the public is spending. The public is               
encouraged to not save all of their money, but to spend it today rather than tomorrow.  
Through the lens of ethicality, responsibility for the increase in state debt is             
distributed unequally. Japanese people do not have a voice in the policymaking process of the               
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BOJ. It is an independent central bank where specialists set out the strategy, together with the                
MOF. But the Japanese people are being made part of the process, as objects designated to                
carry the burden of indebtedness. The debt that is created now, will be a burden to "future                 
generations," as the MOF explained it in its English-language video, thus distributing            
responsibility of the debt burden to people not even born yet. In opposition to the relentlessly                
spending BOJ, the Japanese people are the ones having to live a responsible life and spend                
their money accordingly in the national interest by buying JGB. 
Hierarchy is implicated also, as the policies by the BOJ are presented as self-evident              
and that the public should just accept them. The ethical trap is that if the BOJ does not                  
continue the policy it boldly communicates, even if there are good reasons for this, it breaks                
down its own authority. This could be a reason the BOJ continues the policy of QQE, even                 
though it is criticised greatly and hardly affects the real economy. It still holds on to the                 
vision that the monetary policy is in the long-term national interest. The public is constructed               
as an entity that needs to be informed on what is actually going on and what is going to                   
happen in the future. They need to be corrected. As consumers, they might think mild               
deflation or little inflation is a good thing since products are cheaper, but they need to know                 
how uninformed this idea is. A video published by the BOJ shows a naive unknowing woman                
and the banknote professor (o-satsu hakase), 10.000-Yen note with a moustache           
(BOFchannel 2013). The banknote professor explains the duties of the Bank of Japan, while              
extra attention is given to the negative aspects of deflation. At first the woman is happy about                 
deflation, because the coffee she orders at the cafe will become cheaper. She says: “Being               
able to buy things cheaply would make life a lot easier and it would be a great help.” But the                    
banknote professor explains that not only her coffee will become cheaper, also her salary will               
decrease. As the woman stands corrected, she accepts the new information and the hierarchy              
between her and the BOJ-representative.  
A second construction of the public within the dimension of ethicality contains of the              
gendered aspect of responsibility. Through the issuance of JGB and construction of Japanese             
public debt, every Japanese citizen is inherently partly responsible for the accumulation of             
state debt, albeit in a passive manner. When it comes to active responsibility, women are               
made responsible in a different way than men.  As criticised above, the utilisation of women               
through “womenomics” holds that women must share responsibility by working, but that they             
should primarily be incentivised to start families. A video on the website of Japanese              
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Government Internet TV addresses the issue (Seifu no intānettoterebi 2017). While the            
platform lacks in videos explaining issues with the current financial state, the Abe             
government has published videos explaining the policy for dealing with the aging society, the              
low birth rate and social security.  
The video claims that a working life as a woman is, wrongly, thought to be               
incompatible with motherhood, although the modern situation is different compared to earlier            
days. (Seifu no intānettoterebi 2017). It is no longer the case that grandmothers can easily               
come to help raise the child so the mother can work, because households have become               
smaller and no longer comprise three generations. However, government policies are           
presented as contributing to better conditions for working mothers, such as a great increase in               
day-care facilities and subsidising the price parents have to pay for day-care for their second               
and third child. The video shows statistics that families in which both the father and the                
mother work have increased drastically since the late 1990s. Even though people are depicted              
as abstract figures, female characters can be identified because they wear dresses and male              
characters can be identified because they wear a suit and tie. The video communicates a               
construction the modern woman as being capable of easily combining work and motherhood.             
The government has paved the way for the working mother. 
Another series of short commercial videos by the MOF consists of drawn imagery             
depicting, again, people that have future goals to save for. The first shows two young people                
that suddenly meet each other on the street and want to get married (2017 ​d​).  A second video                 
depicts an entire grown up life: a woman suddenly meets somebody, marries this person, gets               
a child with him who needs to go to cram school, then she buys a house with together with                   
her husband, and in the end, visits Paris as an elderly woman (2017​b​). The message of the                 
video is that this is best achieved and paid for through investing in JGB. It is the                 
most-watched video of the MOFJapan channel. The message is to invest in JGB as a way to                 
cover the high expenses of marriage, that can happen at any time so the public better prepare                 
itself.  
This hints at the instability in the official discourse due to incompatibility between the              
lens of spatiality women, that women should be included in the workforce, albeit in a certain                
way, and the lens of ethicality, that women are still primarily mothers who prepare for and                
prioritise family life. Further, to convey a message of personal responsibility (you have to              
safe for your own future) is in line with the neoliberal approach. A retrenched state lets the                 
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people handle their own affairs. The MOF emphasises that the public must ensure themselves              
that they should be able to handle the costs associated with marriage and starting a family.                
Distributing responsibility of these activities in such a way, allows the MOF to spend less on                
for example childcare facilities and push for more austerity. Also, the way to take care of                
yourself is to invest in JGB, which refinances Japanese state debt, so the construction of of                
the MOF is twofold.  
The responsibilities to take care of yourself and your family differ between men and              
women. Another video shows a young female office worker who thinks about what she shall               
do with her first salary (MOFJapan 2017​c​). She wonders whether she should buy presents, go               
on a holiday or buy herself a musical instrument. After consideration, she decides upon              
investing in Japanese Government Bonds. Note how she thinks of spending her salary on              
superficial items, not on groceries or anything other that is essential for supporting a              
household. 
The videos point to a discursive construction of Japanese people as consumers of state              
debt. Making them complicit to the policy of excessive monetary spending. As households             
make a slow turn from saving towards actively investing in other funds than JGB, the               
government may lose its largest consumer of government bonds (Kang 2010, 569). In light of               
this movement, the identity construction of the public as consumers of JGB makes sense. The               
government may even need to appeal to the public out of patriotic sentiments or moral duty                
(Kang 2010, 578). This explains the nationalistic “all-Japanese” subtext of the videos.  
When citizens are primarily consumers and the government is primarily a producer,            
this also highlights a distribution of values in terms of responsibility. To construct the identity               
of the Japanese population and the BOJ and MOF in such a way, is a depoliticisation of a                  
process that creates an unsustainably high sovereign debt. Debt creation is rendered as             
something that would even be to the benefit of “ordinary” Japanese, as they are framed as                
consumers of JGB by their own ministry, to secure funds for their future plans. Without               
exception these plans that include labour market participation by women (although not as the              
main breadwinner of the family), marriage and child rearing. Not coincidentally this            
promotes a future that would tackle one of the socio-economic issues Abenomics sets out to               
improve, a decreasing population and labour market shortage. Although the MOF is            
obviously aware of the dire state of Japanese public finances, it still refuses to acknowledge               
the limitations of the current policy strategy. This points at an instability in the discourse. 
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Conservative values, especially conservative gender norms, are communicated in the          
JGB commercials. The public is framed in a certain way, with different values according to               
whether you are male or female. The final segment of the video by the BOJ communicating                
what the Bank does and how its policies should be understood, depicts a scene in which a                 
salary man tries to transfer cash to his bank account at a bank office, but no money is                  
accepted (BOJchannel 2013). The cash withdrawal of the housewife next to him is rejected.              
See how the man makes money and the woman spends it? The function of this scene is to                  
explain how important it is that the BOJ maintains financial system stability to ensure              
people’s confidence in the system. Men should have faith in the system as savers, women as                
consumers. But most of all, as Kang notes, the primary issue is to restore the people’s trust in                  
the government’s competence and leadership (Kang 2010, 578). Since, when domestic           
investors keep on purchasing JGB the Japanese government can postpone worrying over debt             
insolvency. 
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Looking through three lenses at once 
 
The lenses of spatiality, temporality and ethicality are closely tied. An incompatibility 
between these lenses reveal a great instability in the discourse examined. In terms of 
spatiality, the BOJ and MOF both includes and excludes the public in official discourse. It 
excludes women and immigrants, while it simultaneously includes their financial operations 
into the everyday lives of the public in general. In reality, the consequences of the monetary 
easing programme are experienced by people no matter the discursive differentiations the 
BOJ and the MOF apply. Devetak notes that the Othering of people in the domestic space is 
connected to the Othering of foreign others (Devetak 2005, 177-178). The move to exclude 
people from the official discourse that come from outside (the immigrant labourers), paves 
the way to excluding people in the domestic space that convey a message official institutions 
rather not hear. For the conservative and nationalistic Japanese government, this exploitative 
aspect of women in non-regular labour positions is something it rather not includes. Instead, 
it focuses on vague descriptions such as "making women shine". Danton notes that Japan's 
economic development has always depended on women working in the peripheral labour 
market and that this part of history is always told as less important (Dalton 2017, 100). 
In terms of temporality, the official discourse creates an Other Self to differentiate 
itself from. This Other Self represents Japan in stagnation, and it is something that society 
needs to break with completely. The creation of an older Self from which to break away is a 
form of what Hansen calls temporal self Othering (Hansen 2006, 36). Through forward 
guidance, the public will know where to go to and what to do to get there. The public needs 
to consume and keep faith in the financial system. As the 2 percent inflation rate is 
established, the gap between tax income and state expenditures will be bridged. In order to 
get to this future, there is no need for immigration or more full-time employed women on the 
labour market. In the future, Japanese society will be aided by technical developments that 
would make immigration superfluous. Therefore, so goes the official discourse, it is not a bad 
thing the government does not completely follow up on its Third Arrow of Abenomics in 
terms of implementation of “womenomics” is disputed. For Japan it will be possible to 
achieve growth without structural reforms that are proposed in the Third Arrow of 
Abenomics. No inclusion of Others, of women and immigrants, that form a threat to 
nationalistic and conservative political discourse are necessary.  
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In the ethical dimension of discourse, the claim of working in the national interest is a 
strong discursive tool. To draw upon the national community is to take on a powerful 
identity, and it simultaneously masks the specific, historical, and thus contestable nature by 
constructing financial policy as an objective, dehistoricized and apolitical demand (Hansen 
2006, 30). The BOJ carries out the tool of monetary policy, the consequences thereof are 
carried by the Japanese people. In such a construction, the BOJ has the power to undertake 
decisive and otherwise exceptional actions, such as the excessive spending that increases the 
public debt level to an unsustainable height. With this comes the construction of 
responsibility for taking these actions, in which a link is created between power and 
responsibility. The problem of deflation is framed within the discourse and the solution of 
monetary easing are both framed within the discourse. The 2 percent inflation rate is 
articulated in the Three Arrows of Abenomics, where after it is made the top priority of 
economic policy. Once identified as such, it would be a great disruption of the discourse not 
to hold on to it anymore. So even when the QQE policy is not effective, it is continued. Even 
as commentators critically review whether there is even such a thing as a 'deflationary 
mind-set' (Shirai 2018). 
Still, through the hierarchical implications of the BOJ and the MOF construction of 
the public, the public is constructed as a naive mass that should follow the image of what a 
bright successful future is for an individual life. Certain values such as starting a family of 
taking care of the family are communicated in the MOF YouTube-videos. Childrearing is 
promoted but this is very expensive, even though the government claims to improve childcare 
facilities and access to these facilities. The government publishes videos explaining how the 
number of facilities has increased and how it becomes less expensive for your second and 
third child, evidently promoting people getting children. The policies are also criticised, that 
the Abe government pats itself on the back while the policies do not go far enough. So costs 
connected to marriage and starting a family are high, what should enable this future anyway 
is to invest in JGB, is the message of the MOF. Not only does this legitimise QQE and make 
the public complicit with monetary easing, it is also seen as a way to solve the problems 
connected to the aging society.  
What is hidden in the discourse by BOJ, is that QQE is not working, that it only 
increases sovereign debt and that the policies by the BOJ are not affecting the real economy. 
Japanese financial institutions have had problems with their strategy for how to intervene in 
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the economy ever since the bubble economy. The public is largely ignored while the BOJ 
focuses on the international context of financial institution. The international focus 
depoliticised the process of policy making, since the responsibility to act in the name of 
national benefit is claimed by the financial institutions. The people, living their everyday 
lives, are side-lined. 
The current situation of Japanese financial institutions strongly hints at a policy 
dilemma, in which doing something is just as harmful as doing nothing (Zehfuss 2014, 617). 
In the BOJ and the Abe government policy towards sovereign debt there is no way forward 
while acting responsibly towards everyone (Zehfuss 2014, 618). For the Bank of Japan this 
dilemma is to either continue with the type of policy they have invested in already so much 
but that fails to work towards their goal and hurts their credibility, or quitting this policy tool 
with no alternative at their disposal that would damage its credibility as well. Quitting the 
monetary easing programme without having reached the results has consequences for the 
BOJ. Will the public still think of it as a reliable institution, worthy of the responsibilities and 
authority that it claims? On the other hand, with the continuation of monetary easing the 
credibility of the BOJ is also at stake. The policy dilemma of the Abe administration includes 
the dilemma by the BOJ, but also goes a bit further. In order to fully carry out the Three 
Arrows of Abenomics, the government should aim at a more inclusive Japan. More 
immigrants are needed to fill empty spots in the workforce and more beneficial circumstances 
should be created for women, especially mothers, to take full part in the in the workforce. 
However, the political direction the Abe government is heading is conservative (despite 
“womenomics”) and nationalistic (despite the need for foreign labour).  
The choice in the aporia is delayed by the BOJ and the Abe government, although 
even this is a choice. In order to be able to continue the policy direction and present the 
resulting state debt as though it is sustainable, it requires the specific construction of the 
public as a silent mass following the financial institutions in their guidance. It requires a 
construction of the public as ethical consumer, buying Japanese government bonds. It 
requires a spatial differentiation between women and men, female caregiver and male 
full-time employee. It requires the public not to worry and ignore the debt. 
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Conclusion 
 
Abenomics, the strategy by the Abe government to boost the national economy, consists of 
three arrows: monetary easing by the Bank of Japan, increased government spending and 
structural reforms. The first two arrows have been carried out with great intensity, especially 
the monetary easing programme of the BOJ. This essay has set out to do a poststructuralist 
discourse analysis on the construction of identity through the distribution of authority and 
responsibility. To look through the lens of ethicality at the official discourse of Japan’s 
financial institutions, the Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance, under the Abe 
administration on the increase in sovereign debt through the Quantitative and Qualitative 
Easing programme. This essay has argued against the claim that Japanese state debt is 
sustainable, by looking into the temporal, spatial and ethical construction that is necessary to 
continue with the monetary easing programme. To repeat the research question: how is 
everyday life and the public constructed in the official discourse by the Bank of Japan and the 
Ministry of Finance to allow for a continuation of the monetary easing programme?  
Through these lenses, everyday life is constructed as inherently connected to the Bank 
of Japan. The institution writes itself in the lives of the public by claiming that they function 
as a precondition to everyday life. The discursive construction of this connection focuses on 
staying close to the experience of the public with money, thus constructing the public as a 
consumer. Life as a consumer cannot be imagined without money. However, not everyone is 
included in this narrative, as the construction of the public includes men and women in 
stereotyped roles. Non-Japanese are not included at all. This image is not on par with the 
need for an increase in the working age population in order to decrease the gap between tax 
income and state expenditure. However, the conservative idea of what society should look 
like better fits the nationalistic political goals of the Abe government. Since the labour 
shortage issue remains, the counter narrative constructed includes technical innovations and 
AI as substitutions for employees. 
The public is identified as a passive nameless entity, that is not a part of the policy 
making process although it affects them disproportionately. Secondly, official discourse 
identified the public as static, excluding non-Japanese and working women. Although the 
public shifts and women and immigrants demand a greater role in the economy, the picture of 
the public is static and conservative. Thirdly, official discourse constructs the public as a 
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consumer. In a series of videos, it approached the Japanese people as consumers and the 
Japanese government bonds as product the enterprise Japan has to sell in the market. Within 
these images of Japanese people, a rather conservative image of the Japanese family is 
constructed. This questions to what extent the Abe government is working towards 
implementing aspects of the Third Arrow of Abenomics, especially regarding “womenomics” 
and allowing immigrants to live and work in Japan.      
Davies argues that finance is only experienced as part of everyday life by the public 
as a disruptive force. Through discourse building, the Bank of Japan writes the public and 
everyday life into their preferred discursive narrative. The activities by the BOJ and the MOF 
form a condition to a stable economy and everyday life, allowing these institutions to 
continue current policy and holding unto the dominant and conservative socio-economic 
ideas concerning the inflation rate target and women and immigrants in Japanese society. The 
instability in discourse concerns spatial, temporal and ethical elements. On the one hand, the 
BOJ and MOF want the public to accept the consequences of finance in their everyday life. 
They are motivated to consume financial products and financial ideas. On the other hand, 
financial institutions exclude the public from actively taking part in the manner of how 
responsibility should be taken. Governor Kuroda has been re elected this year, which could 
also be interpreted as a sign of aporia. To continue is not really a sustainable option, but to 
quit now would probably lead to confusion in the financial markets and the public, both of 
these entities not knowing what to believe. 
To construct the public into families consisting of patriotic consumers, part time 
working mothers, self sacrificing fathers, in JGB investing citizens allows the BOJ and the 
MOF to hold on to authority and emphasise their credibility. As society changes, such as the 
increasing participation by women in the labour market and the need of foreign labour to 
tackle the problems of the aging society, and monetary easing is not working the way the 
BOJ and MOF expected, the financial institutions still try to get a grip on it by writing their 
own construction of the public into their discourse. In order to continue the domestic 
absorption of JGB, the MOF needs a discursive framing of the public as consumers of state 
debt. From the neoliberal inspired discourse by the financial institutions, the public is talked 
down to and constructed in a certain way. Focus by these institutions on gaining continued 
support in their credibility through constructing a specific type of discourse that allows these 
institutions to continue monetary easing. The lesson from Japan to the world is not only to 
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focus on the material dimensions of financial institutions, but also to incorporate the 
discursive elements in research. This gains insights into the discursive precondition of 
financial policies. 
For further research, the oppositional discourse to the official discourse regarding 
QQE of the Bank of Japan and Ministry of Finance can be researched more fully. Japan is 
one of many states worldwide dealing with state debt and adhering to the global trend of debt 
consolidation. Another idea for further research, the discourse by financial institutions of the 
public that allows for state debt to rise of other state can be assessed. The discursive 
strategies of institutions in different states can even be compared. Perhaps besides the global 
turn towards the consolidation state is accompanied with a discursive construction of the 
public to enforce consolidation policies.  
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